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IN DEFENSE OF PATCO
MITCHELL J. NOTIS*
Never before has there been such a deliberate effort to
eliminate a national union .... The Administration has
ignored constructive avenues for resolving the conflict.
1
Letter from Representative John Conyers to
the New York Times, 8/13/81.
O N AUGUST 3, 1981 more than twelve thousand air traffic
controllers went on strike against their employer, the Fed-
eral Aviation Administration (FAA), an agency within the
United States Department of Transportation (DOT).2 As a re-
sult of the events which began on August 3, virtually all of the
twelve thousand striking controllers were discharged from
their jobs. The labor union to which the strikers belonged, the
Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization (PATCO),
had all of its assets attached,3 filed a bankruptcy petition,
and had its certification to act as the union representing FAA
air traffic controllers revoked.5 The striking controllers and
PATCO became personae non grata in the eyes of the FAA
*Staff Counsel, American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO. B.A.
1975, Brandeis University; J.D. 1978, Georgetown University. The views expressed
are his own and not necessarily those of the AFGE.
N. Y. Times, Aug. 13, 1981, at 22, col. 3.
N. Y. Times, Aug. 4, 1981, at 1, col. 6; Id., Aug. 16, 1981, at 37, col. 1.
Air Transp. Ass'n of America v. PATCO, No. 81-0173 (D.D.C. Aug. 7, 1981).
In re PATCO, No. 81-00656 (D.D.C., filed Nov. 25, 1981).
Professional Air Traffic Controllers Org., 7 Fed. Lab. Rel. Auth. No. 10 (October
22, 1981), appeal docketed, No. 81-2135 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 22, 1981).
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and the DOT.
This article, in defending the actions of PATCO and its
members, indicts the government's antiquated labor relations
policies for provoking PATCO and its members into striking.
The actions which these policies engendered will serve as
more than a mere chronicle of the Reagan administration's la-
bor relations policies; eventually, the desire to prevent recur-
rences of the events under discussion will cause these actions
to be prime justification for allowing federal workers to have
the legal right to strike.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On June 22, 1981, after five months of negotiations, the ne-
gotiating teams for PATCO and the FAA reached agreement
on a tentative contract. The proposed agreement contained
the following key provisions:7
(a) 42 hours of pay for 40 hours of work;
(b) a 15% premium for night work;
(c) exemption of night, Sunday and holiday premium pay from
the maximum annual pay limitation for federal employees;'
(d) a $2300 annual pay increase in addition to the annual pay
increases received by other federal employees.
A tally of votes completed on July 29, revealed that ninety-
six percent of PATCO members had rejected the proposed
contract."
On July 31, PATCO President, Robert E. Poli, and Secre-
tary of Transportation, Drew Lewis, resumed negotiations.' 0
' Affidavit of Dennis Reardon, PATCO Negotiations Spokesman, at 1; FAA, Dep't
of Transp., Fed. Lab. Rel. Auth. No. 3-CA-2729; Letter from the Regional Director,
FLRA Region III, to Richard J. Leighton (August 25, 1981) (declining to issue com-
plaint in FAA, Dep't of Transp., Fed. Lab. Rel. Auth. No. 3-CA-2729, at 1).
N. Y. Times, July 30, 1981, at 12, col. 2; Id., Aug. 1, 1981, at 13, col. 1.
5 U.S.C. § 5308 (1976).
• The vote was 13,495 against the agreement, and 616 in favor of it (approximately
2,000 controllers in the PATCO bargaining unit were not PATCO members, and
therefore were not entitled to vote). N. Y. Times, July 30, 1981, at 12, col. 2.
1o Letter from the Regional Director, FLRA Region III, to Richard J. Leighton
(Aug. 25, 1981) (declining to issue complaint in FAA, Dep't of Transp., Fed. Lab. Rel.
Auth. No. 3-CA-2729, at 1). [Hereinafter cited as Regional Director's Letter]
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Mr. Poli submitted to Mr. Lewis a revised version of
PATCO's January, 1981 contract proposal, revealing the dele-
tion of several sections, in an effort to reduce the total cost of
the proposal and stimulate bargaining." The parties met
again on August 1, at which time Poli's request for a counter-
proposal was denied.'"
Negotiations were resumed on August 2. Mr. Poli informed
Mr. Lewis that the union was willing to modify its position if
the FAA would offer a counterproposal to PATCO's July 31
proposal."' Although he denied submitting a counterpro-
posal, 4 Lewis submitted a proposal to Poli which was claimed
to be worth $10 million more than the June 22 tentative
agreement.' 5 In actuality, the total cost of the proposal to the
FAA was $15 million less than the June agreement.'" Lewis'
offer was rejected and negotiations terminated at 2:30 a.m. on
Monday, August 3V'
In the early morning hours of August 3, 1981, air traffic con-
trollers across the United States went on strike.' 8 Between
August 3 and August 5, twelve thousand of the nation's seven-
teen thousand controllers participated in the walkout.' 9 In re-
PATCO Appeal to FLRA General Counsel of Refusal to Issue Complaint at 2, in
FAA, Dep't of Transp., Fed. Lab. Rel. Auth. No. 3-CA-2729 (Aug. 27, 1981).
" Regional Director's Letter, supra note 10, at 1.
I Id.
" Affidavit of Robert E. Poli, PATCO President, at 10, FAA, Dep't of Transp.,
Fed. Lab. Rel. Auth. No. 3-CA-2729.
Regional Director's Letter, supra note 10, at 2.
The rejected tentative agreement provided for a benefits package worth $40 mil-
lion in each of three years, resulting in a total value of $120 million. The August 2
proposal provided for an escalating benefits package worth $20 million in the first
year, $35 million in the second year, and $50 million in the third year, resulting in a
total value of $105 million. Washington Post, Aug. 4, 1981, at 7, col. 6. Additionally,
Secretary Lewis demanded that PATCO's acceptance of the August 2 proposal be
conditioned upon the following terms: (1) The FAA would not reopen discussions of
the non-economic proposals submitted by the Union; (2) the Union would have to
obtain the approval of its entire negotiating team before a new agreement could be
reached; and (3) the entire third year package had to be in the form of increased
benefits, as opposed to increased wages. Regional Director's Letter, supra note 10, at
2.
" Regional Director's Letter, supra note 10, at 2; N. Y. Times, Aug. 3, 1981, at 1,
col. 6.
18 N. Y. Times, Aug. 4, 1981, at 1, col. 6.
N. Y. Times, Aug. 16, 1981, at 37, col. 1.
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sponse to the strike, President Reagan announced on August
3 that any controllers who did not report back to work within
48 hours would be fired.2 0 In the meantime, Department of
Justice attorneys had obtained restraining orders against
PATCO and its members, enjoining them from engaging in a
strike and ordering them back to work, in 66 federal judicial
districts.2 Criminal complaints were filed against a number of
PATCO members in fourteen different cities," and several
PATCO members were jailed.'
On August 5, 1981, Secretary of Transportation Drew Lewis
announced that "as of 11:00 today, the strike is over."' Sub-
sequent to Lewis' declaration, the Federal Labor Relations
Authority (FLRA) revoked PATCO's certification to act as
the exclusive bargaining representative for FAA air traffic
controllers,' 5 and the twelve thousand air traffic controllers
who did not respond to the President's offer to return to work
were fired."
It has been said of the air traffic controllers' strike: "At the
heart of the struggle is a disagreement over wages, and work-
ing conditions. In addition, it appears that the striking con-
trollers are desperately attempting to achieve status for them-
selves as individuals and workers, as well as for their union.' ' 7
On its face, the PATCO strike seems no different than
many other labor disputes; yet itis. Why, for instance, did the
controllers strike, knowing as they did that they would in all
likelihood be fired, and their union severely punished? It is
"0 President's Statement on Air Traffic Controller's Strike, 17 WEEKLY Comp. PRES.
Doc. 845 (Aug. 3, 1981); N. Y. Times, Aug. 4, 1981, at B8, col. 1.
" Wall St. J., Aug. 6, 1981, at 3, col. 3. See also PATCO Brief in Support of Excep-
tions to the Decision of the Administrative Law Judge, Professional Air Traffic Con-
trollers Org., 7 Fed. Lab. Rel. Auth. No. 10 (Oct. 22, 1981).
" Wall St. J., Aug. 6, 1981, at 3, col. 4.
23 N. Y. Times, Aug. 6, 1981, at 1, col. 6.
2 United States v. PATCO, No. 81-1805 (D.D.C., Aug. 11, 1981) (memorandum
order); PATCO Brief in Support of Exceptions to the Decision of the Administrative
Law Judge, Professional Air Traffic Controllers Org., 7 Fed. Lab. Rel. Auth. No. 10
(Oct. 22, 1981).
" Professional Air Traffic Controllers Org., 7 Fed. Lab. Rel. Auth. No. 10 (Oct. 22,
1981), appeal docketed, No. 81-2135 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 22, 1981).
20 1981 GOV'T. EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) 926:12.
27 N. Y. Times, Aug. 10, 1981, at D10, col. 2.
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necessary to examine the individual controller and his work-
place to find the answer.
II. THE CONTROLLER AND His WORKPLACE
[W]hen working people feel a deep sense of grievance,
they will exercise what I think is a basic human right, the
right to withdraw their services, not to work under condi-
tions they no longer find tolerable.
I think that right is inherent and one that is not ade-
quately addressed by legislative remedies simply saying
that it is against the law.2 s
Lane Kirkland, President of the AFL-CIO,
speaking at a news conference hours after
the controllers' strike began.
Air traffic controllers are responsible for directing the air
traffic in our skies, earning an average base pay of $33,000 per
year.29 In order to enter the FAA Academy for three to four
months of initial training, potential controllers must have
high school diplomas, and be able to pass various physical and
psychological tests.30 Their ample compensation and extensive
training notwithstanding, controllers have traditionally not
been satisfied with their jobs.
Air traffic controllers have had a history of militant union-
ism at least since 1969, when controllers engaged in massive
absenteeism in many parts of the country.31 In 1970, control-
lers joined in a three week job action which also involved mass
absenteeism.3 2 As a result of its participation in and condona-
tion of the 1970 strike, PATCO's certification as an exclusive
representative was revoked for five months.3 During two days
28 N. Y. Times, Aug. 4, 1981, at B8, col. 5.
N. Y. Times, July 30, 1981, at 12, col. 2.
10 Newsweek, Aug. 17, 1981, at 22.
" See, e.g., Leyden v. FAA, 315 F. Supp. 1398 (E.D.N.Y. 1970).
" See, e.g., Air Transp. Ass'n v. PATCO, 313 F. Supp. 181 (E.D.N.Y.), vacated in
part sub noma., United States v. PATCO, 438 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402
U.S. 915 (1971).
3S Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization, Inc., 1 Decisions & Reports on
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in May and two days in June of 1978, controllers started a
work slowdown."' As their labor relations history suggests,
controllers are not satisfied with their working conditions.
They have good cause to complain:
At larger facilities they may work in vast windowless rooms,
juggling 30 aircraft at a time, each appearing only as blips and
a computer-generated set of numbers on radar scopes. The job
can demand split-second timing and constant concentration.
Controllers typically work rotating shifts, some times [sic]
punching out at 11 p.m. and returning by 7 a.m. the next day.
.. . An FAA-commissioned study of 416 controllers found
that they are twice as likely to develop high blood pressure as
most other workers .... The study also found that a major
source of stress was not the job itself, but tensions between
controllers and managers.
Controllers concede that their chief complaint is not money
but hours, working conditions and a lack of recognition for the
pressures they face.8 5
The study referred to above was conducted by behavioral
scientists at Boston University." At a cost to the FAA of $2.8
million, controllers at Boston's Logan Airport were observed
from 1973 through 1978.87 The study recommended, among
other things, that steps be taken to improve air traffic control-
ler labor relations.8 After the controllers' strike began, one of
the psychiatrists who conducted the study, Dr. Robert Rose,
was interviewed by the Christian Science Monitor.3 In the
interview, Rose expounded on the root causes of the strike:
I believe the strike is a result of the alienation of the control-
Rulings of Ass't Sec'y of Labor for Labor Mgmt. Rel. 71 (1971); Professional Air
Traffic Controllers Organization, Inc., 1 Decisions & Reports on Rulings of Ass't Sec'y
of Labor for Labor Mgmt. Rel. 268 (1971).
See, e.g., Air Transp. Ass'n v. PATCO, 453 F. Supp. 1287 (E.D.N.Y.), alf'd, 594
F.2d 851 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 944 (1979).
" Newsweek, Aug. 17, 1981, at 22-23.
N. Y. Times, Aug. 9, 1981, at 23, col. 1.
7 Id.; Christian Sci. Monitor, Aug. 7, 1981, at 12, col. 1 (Eastern ed.).
' Christian Sci. Monitor, Aug. 17, 1981, at 3, col. 1 (Eastern ed.).
" Christian Sci. Monitor, Aug. 7, 1981, at 12, col. 1 (Eastern ed.).
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lers from their management. Most of the time when something
goes wrong, the controllers are not supported by their supervi-
sors - they are left out there all alone.
[T]here is no positive reienforcement [sic] ....
All they get is negative reinforcement if something goes
wrong.
• ..[T]he government can fire all of them and bring in an
entirely new crew . . . but the seeds of discontent that caused
this strike will still be there . . . the problem is the FAA's lack
of willingness to acknowledge in a significant way that there is
a problem.'0
The FAA has paid little heed to the results of the study it
commissioned. Its indifference is particularly reproachable be-
cause the alienation and discontent shown by air traffic con-
trollers is not a unique industrial relations problem; indeed, it
is "similar to that identified in industry and many commercial
jobs at least a decade ago."' 1
The reaction by the government to this labor relations
problem is disappointing. The administrator of the FAA, J.
Lynn Helms, has been quoted as saying in relation to the
work that controllers do, "[tihere is no stress.""' Secretary of
Transportation, Drew Lewis, qualified his statement that con-
trollers "have a difficult job" by saying that "other jobs have
stress, too."'
In answer to the stress and dissatisfaction undergone by air
traffic controllers, PATCO leadership emphasized financial
benefits in their bargaining proposals. It was easier for both
sides to the negotiations to focus their attention on remunera-
tion, instead of facing the more difficult task of admitting to
40 Id.
41 N. Y. Times, Aug. 10, 1981, at D10, col. 2-3.
42 Id. at col. 3.
41 CBS Interview with Drew Lewis, Secretary of Transportation (Aug. 5, 1981);
PATCO Brief Supporting Exceptions to the Decision of the Administrative Law
Judge, Professional Air Traffic Controllers Org., 7 Fed. Lab. Rel. Auth. No. 10 (Oct.
22, 1981). Four days after he had declared the PATCO strike to be over, Lewis stated
that controllers probably did have some legitimate grievances and said that the
charge that the FAA was "a bad boss to work for" was "probably a legitimate
charge." N. Y. Times, Aug. 10, 1981, at D10, col. 1.
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having failed to create an efficient and effective workplace, re-
sponsive to the needs of employer and employees. In walking
off their jobs on August 3, as much as anything else, control-
lers were striking for recognition of the difficulties of their
jobs. Striking in support of PATCO's bargaining demands al-
lowed controllers to bring worldwide attention to the errors of
FAA personnel management and administration. It was a final
attempt to solve a decade's worth of problems.
III. FEDERAL EMPLOYEE STRIKES
[T]he remedy sought is a death sentence - industrial capi-
tal punishment....
Comments of FLRA Chief Administrative
Law Judge John Fenton on the FLRA Gen-
eral Counsel's request that PATCO be per-
manently barred from functioning as a fed-
eral sector labor union."
Government's stance resembled the actions of the Federal
Government and employers ... in the first decade of the
century.
New York Times article on press conference
held by Lane Kirkland, President of the
AFL-CIO, shortly after the controllers'
strike began."'
The history of strikes by American working people virtually
parallels the history of the United States itself. Printers went
on strike in New York in 1794; cabinet makers struck in 1796;
carpenters in Philadelphia in 1797; and cordwainers in 1799."'
The first recorded strike by federal employees occurred al-
" Professional Air Traffic Controllers Org., 7 Fed. Lab. Rel. Auth. No. 10 (1981)
(opinion of Chief A.L.J. Fenton, at 6, attached as addendum), appeal docketed, No.
81-2135 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 22, 1981).
N. Y. Times, Aug. 4, 1981, at B8, col. 6.
, 88 AFL-CIO Am. Federationist No. 3, 3 (March 1981).
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most that long ago, in the Navy Yard in Washington, D.C. in
August of 1835.47 In the years prior to the Civil War, Navy
Department employees also went on strike at the Philadelphia
Navy Yard and the Charlestown, Massachusetts Navy Yard.48
Strikes and other job actions by federal employees have con-
tinued up to the present time, with varying degrees of
frequency.49
The right of private sector employees to strike was recog-
nized in 1935 with the passage by Congress of the National
Labor Relations Act.50 Although the right to strike has been
modified at times by Congress and federal courts, both enti-
ties have recognized its legitimate use as a tool of organized
labor.8 1 The regulation of strikes in the public sector in recent
years has followed a different course.
In 1955, Congress enacted Public Law No. 84-330'2 in order
to "prohibit the employment by the Government of the
United States of persons who are disloyal or who participate
in or assert the right to strike against the Government of the
United States. . .. "" Public Law No. 84-330 contains three
major provisions:5 4 (1) a prohibition on the employment of
persons who, inter alia, engage in strikes against the govern-
"7 ZISKIND, ONE THOUSAND STRIKES OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES 24 (1971) [herein-
after cited as ZISKIND].
Id., at 25.
See, e.g., H. EDWARDS, R. CLARK, & C. CRAVER, LABOR RELATIONS LAW IN THE
PUBLIC SECTOR 493 (2d ed. 1979); ZISKIND, supra note 47 at 24-33, 133-184; Work
Stoppages in Government, 1979, GOV'T. EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) Reference File No.
71:1011, 1014 (1980).
50 Act of July 5, 1935, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449, amended by Act of June 23, 1947, ch.
120, 61 Stat. 136 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976)). In particular, section 7 of
the Act recognizes the right of employees to engage in connected activities. Id. § 157.
Section 8(a) of the Act protects employees from employer interference with, or dis-
crimination based upon the exercise of, Section 7 rights. Id. § 158(a).
'" See, e.g., NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 233-36 (1963).
51 Act of August 9, 1955, Pub. L. No. 84-330, 69 Stat. 624 (1955).
53 S. REP. No. 1256, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1955 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 2873.
" For the purposes of this discussion, only the provisions of Pub. L. No. 84-330
dealing with striking are relevant. Section 1(3) of the act, regarding asserting the
right to strike, is of questionable constitutionality, and has been held invalid by at
least one court. See National Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. Blount, 305 F. Supp. 546
(D.D.C. 1969), appeal dismissed, 400 U.S. 801 (1970).
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ment;55 (2) a requirement that prospective employees execute
an affidavit stating that they are not striking;56 and (3) crimi-
nal sanctions for violation of the section of the law prohibiting
the employment of strikers. 57
Section 1 of Public Law No. 84-330,11 reads in relevant part
as follows:
[N]o person shall accept or hold office or employment in the
Government of the United States ... who-
(3) participates in any strike . . . against the government of
the United States. . .59
Section 2 of Public Law No. 84-330,60 reads in relevant part
as follows:
[E]very person who accepts office or employment in the Gov-
ernment of the United States. . . shall,. . . execute an affida-
vit that his acceptance and holding of such office or employ-
ment does not or (if the affidavit is executed prior to
acceptance of such office or employment) will not constitute a
violation of the first section of this Act. Such affidavit shall be
considered prima facie evidence that the acceptance and hold-
ing of office or employment by the person executing the affida-
vit does not or will not constitute a violation of such
section....
The language of section 2 indicates that the affidavit re-
quired by that section was intended by Congress to be a sworn
disclaimer of an applicant's status as a striker at the moment
of accepting employment. The affidavit was not intended to
relate in any way to the employee's conduct after accepting a
position with the government. The initial codification of sec-
tion 2 of the Act omits the parenthetical language of the stat-
ute, as does the later statutory recodification of the section."'
11 Act of August 9, 1955, Pub. L. No. 84-330, § 1(3), 69 Stat. 624 (1955) (codified at
5 U.S.C. § 7311).
e Id. § 2 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 3333).
Id. § 3 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1918).
88 Id. § 1.
8 Id. § 1(3).
00 Id. § 2.
e, Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 424 (1966) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 3333
(1976)).
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These omissions, however, change neither the meaning nor
the import of the section. Principles of statutory construction
require that precedence be given to original statutory lan-
guage to the extent that any conflict exists between the lan-
guage of a statute and subsequent codifications. 2
Section 3 of Public Law No. 84-330, codified at 18 U.S.C. §
1918, provides that any person violating section 1 of that act
shall be guilty of a felony, and shall be fined or imprisoned.
Upon a cursory reading of the above laws, it would seem that
section 3 of Public Law No. 84-330, in making the violation of
section 1 (prohibiting strikers from accepting or holding gov-
ernment employment) a felony, makes it a felony for federal
employees to go on strike. A closer examination of the time
frame encompassed by section 2 shows this assumption to be
incorrect.
Section 2 requires the execution of an affidavit relating to
present conduct's if a position is accepted concurrently with
the execution of the required affidavit, or future conduct" if a
position is to be accepted after executing the affidavit. The
affidavit is, therefore, an affirmation that at the exact time
when a person accepts government employment, he is not
then striking against the federal government. The affidavit of
", Where a conflict exists between a codification and a statute, the statute will pre-
vail. See, e.g., United States v. Dunham Concrete Products Inc., 475 F.2d 1241 (5th
Cir.), reh. denied, 477 F.2d 596 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 832 (1973); American
Export Lines Inc. v. United States, 290 F.2d 925 (Ct. Cl. 1961).
When statutes are revised, consolidated, or recodified, it will not be inferred that
Congress intended to change their effect, unless such an intention is clearly ex-
pressed. See, e.g., Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454 (1975).
Additionally, the language of the codification of section 2 (5 U.S.C. § 3333) indicates
that the required affidavit is to be a disclaimer of present striker status, not future
striker status. This section requires the affiant to state that his "acceptance and hold-
ing" of a position will not violate the strike prohibition, not that his "acceptance or
holding" will not violate the prohibition., The "acceptance and holding" language is
indicative of one particular point in time, the time that a person is initially hired.
(emphasis added)
63 If the affidavit is executed prior to acceptance of such office or employment, the
employee must execute an affidavit that his acceptance and holding of such office or
employment "does not. . . constitute a violation." Act of August 9, 1955, Pub. L. No.
84-330, § 2, ch. 690, 69 Stat. 624, 624-25 (1955).
" If the affidavit is executed prior to acceptance of such office or employment, the
employee must execute an affidavit that his acceptance and holding of such office or
employment '!qwill not ... constitute a violation . . . ."Id.
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nonstriker status relates solely to the time that a person is
initially hired by the government.
Because section 2 states that the affidavit is evidence that
section 1 has not been violated, section 1 must also relate
solely to the time of initial hiring. It seems that an applicant
violates section 1 if he accepts an offer of employment from
the government while he is on strike. Such an interpretation is
in accord with the stated purpose of Public Law No. 84-330,
to prohibit the employment by the government of persons en-
gaging in strikes.
The mandate of section 1 can also be read to enjoin the ex-
ecutive branch from hiring strikers, instead of preventing
strikers from accepting positions. In that case, a federal man-
ager violates the proscription of section 1 by hiring a person
he knows to be striking against the government. Additionally,
there are those who say that the statute makes it a crime for
federal employees to strike. The vague and confusing language
of Public Law No. 84-330 causes due process problems by
forcing federal employees to guess at the law's meaning."
This vagueness makes the law void as a penal statute." Con-
sequently, the controllers did not violate a valid penal statute
when they went on strike.
The affidavit required by Public Law No. 84-330, the only
relevant proscription in the statute, was not violated by strik-
ing controllers, because they were not striking at the time
they were initially hired by the government. The controllers,
however, were required to sign an affidavit which was not
based upon Public Law No. 84-330. The affidavit controllers
were required to sign by the Office of Personnel Management
(OPM) states that the affiant not only "is not" participating
in a strike against the government, but "will not" participate
in such a strike. Such an affidavit as to future actions is not
required by Public Law No. 84-330, and OPM had no other
legal authority upon which to base the requirement; therefore,
'5 Compare, United Fed'n of Postal Clerks v. Blount, 325 F. Supp. 879, (D.D.C.
1969), aff'd., 404 U.S. 802 (1970).
" See, e.g., Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 390 (1979); Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1, 77 (1976).
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the affidavit was an illegal, ultra vires, action by the OPM.
The affidavit in question was signed by controllers due to
the misrepresentations made to them by OPM regarding the
legal necessity of executing such an affidavit. They were under
the mistaken belief that signing such an affidavit was a pre-
requisite to becoming an air traffic controller. It is contrary to
public policy to enforce an affidavit which was wrongfully re-
quired. Therefore, the affidavit signed by the controllers is a
nullity.
IV. PATCO's DEFENSE
Having set forth the legal and factual background in which
PATCO and its members engaged in a strike against the fed-
eral government, PATCO's defense can be analyzed. The de-
fense is intended as a justification, not as an apology.
A. No Alternatives to Striking Existed on August 3, 1981
As previously discussed, the FAA not only had no intention
of trying to resolve its serious internal labor relations
problems relating to controllers, it refused to admit that any
problems existed. 7 Consequently, controllers received no help
from FAA management in resolving the employment
problems.
The FLRA provided no reasonable alternative, either.
Whatever may have been the basis for PATCO's doubts con-
cerning the efficacy of the FLRA-supplied remedies, such
doubts proved justifiable as the strike progressed. During the
strike, the FLRA denied that it alone had the authority to: (1)
adjudicate unfair labor practice strikes," arguing that such
authority was shared with the federal courts;19 or (2) seek in-
junctions against PATCO in federal court.70 The FLRA took
these positions even though it had previously argued success-
:7 See supra notes 28-43 and accompanying text.
8 Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 7116(b)(7)(A), it is an unfair labor practice for a federal
sector labor union to engage in a strike.
'9 Brief for Amicus Curiae Federal Labor Relations Authority, Air Transp. Ass'n v.
PATCO, appeal docketed, No. 81-7447 (2d Cir. June 22, 1981).
70 Id.
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fully in two district courts that its exclusive jurisdiction over
unfair labor practices precluded district courts from asserting
jurisdiction.71
PATCO argued during the strike72 that FLRA jurisdiction
over unfair labor practices, such as strikes, preempts federal
courts from asserting jurisdiction over federal sector strikes
without FLRA initiation, exactly like the exclusive jurisdic-
tion over unfair labor practices held by the National Labor
Relations Board prevents federal courts from asserting juris-
diction over private sector unfair labor practices.7 8 FLRA ex-
clusive jurisdiction over unfair labor practice strikes would
preclude parties other than the FLRA from successfully in-
voking district court jurisdiction to adjudicate or enjoin fed-
eral employee strikes.74 If the FLRA had asserted its exclusive
jurisdiction over unfair labor practice strikes during the
PATCO strike, only one action would have been brought
against PATCO, instead of sixty-six, and millions of dollars of
contempt fines would not have accumulated against PATCO.
As a last resort, PATCO brought the existence of its dispute
with the FAA into the public arena in the hope that the
weight of public opinion would be brought to bear against the
FAA. To do this, a strike was necessary. Due to the failure of
all other avenues of relief by August 3, 1981, PATCO and its
members had virtually no choice but to strike. Their com-
plaints were not being heeded, and the pressures on control-
lers went unabated. As the Honorable J. Skelly Wright,
United States Circuit Judge, has written in commenting on
the ban on federal sector strikes:
If the inherent purpose of a labor organization is to bring the
"' Clark v. Mark, No. 79-CV-777 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 1980); National Fed'n of Fed.
Employees, Local 1263 v. Commandant, Defense Language Inst., 493 F. Supp. 675
(N.D. Cal. 1980).
"' See, e.g., Defendant's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to
Plaintiff's Renewed Motion for Entry of Judgment on Civil Contempt, United States
v. PATCO, No. 81-1805 (D.D.C., filed Aug. 3, 1981).
7' See, e.g., San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959); Buck-
ley v. American Fed'n of Television & Radio Artists, 496 F.2d 305 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1093 (1974).
7 See, e.g., National Fed'n of Fed. Employees, Local 1263 v. Commandant, De-
fense Language Inst., 493 F. Supp. 675, 681 (N.D. Cal. 1980).
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workers' interests to bear on management, the right to strike
is, historically and practically, an important means of effectu-
ating that purpose. A union that never strikes, or which can
make no credible threat to strike, may wither away in
ineffectiveness.7
B. President Reagan Broke His Word
PATCO and its members were relying upon President Rea-
gan to remedy the egregious conditions under which they
worked. According to the text of a letter released by
PATCO,7 1 President Reagan, as a candidate for the presi-
dency, wrote a letter to PATCO President Robert Poli expres-
sing awareness of the "deplorable state of our nations's air
traffic control system." 77 Reagan pledged to replace obsolete
equipment, and to adjust manning levels and working hours.76
He also pledged to work with the controllers in a "spirit of
cooperation" and "harmony."' In exchange for these
promises, Reagan received PATCO's support during the 1980
elections.' 0
Even though President Reagan was aware of the root causes
of controller dissatisfaction, he did nothing prior to the
PATCO strike to upgrade air traffic control equipment,
change the hours worked by controllers, or improve controller
morale. Reagan's inflexible, severe decision to resolve the
PATCO strike by firing striking controllers is certainly not in
keeping with his promise to work with the controllers in a
constructive manner to help solve their problems. The Presi-
dent's actions prior to and during the PATCO strike were a
repudiation of the promises he made in return for PATCO's
support during the 1980 presidential campaign.
75 United Fed'n of Postal Clerks v. Blount, 325 F. Supp. 879, (D.D.C.) (Wright, J.,
concurring), aff'd., 404 U.S. 802 (1971).
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C. The Government Violated the Law
President Reagan, the Secretary of Transportation and the
Administrator of the FAA, broke the law prior to, and during,
the PATCO strike. They did this by bargaining with PATCO
over various aspects of controller compensation. It is illegal to
bargain over conditions of employment for federal employees
which are already provided for by existing laws.8' Therefore, it
is contrary to law to negotiate over (a) pay for federal employ-
ees,82 (b) the maximum legal amount of annual pay for federal
employees,83 or, (c), the amount of premium pay for
nightwork to which federal employees are entitled. 4 The gov-
ernment illegally negotiated with PATCO on all of these
subjects.
By knowingly conducting collective bargaining in an area
that is forbidden by law, the FAA and DOT introduced an
extralegal element into their labor dispute with PATCO. They
carried the dispute into a "gray area" in which politics, not
the law, dictated the limits of their dispute, and the limits of
allowable actions.88 Having put aside certain laws governing
federal sector labor relations, the government should be es-
topped from claiming that PATCO and individual air traffic
controllers violated the law. The government was in pari
delicto in relation to PATCO. The government did not come
into the PATCO strike with clean hands, and should not now
be heard to complain that air traffic controllers alone have ig-
nored relevant laws. The President does not have any greater
right than the average citizen to choose the laws which he will
obey.
D. The Government Refused to Bargain in Good Faith
5 U.S.C. §§ 7102(2), 7103(a)(14)(C) (1976).
" 5 U.S.C. § 5332(a) (1980).
5 U.S.C. § 5308 (1976).
', 5 U.S.C. § 5545 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
SB See Summers, Public Sector Bargaining, Problems of Governmental Decision-
making, 44 U. CIN. L. REV. 669, 669-73 (1975) for a discussion of the role played by
political considerations in public sector labor relations.
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With PATCO
Prior to the strike, the government refused to submit coun-
terproposals to PATCO's bargaining offers.86 Secretary Lewis
flatly refused to bargain with PATCO after the strike began,
despite PATCO's requests.87 PATCO was still a certified ex-
clusive representative at that point. The government's refusal
to bargain with PATCO was not justified; its allegations that
PATCO was engaging in an illegal work stoppage did not re-
lieve it of the duty to bargain. The government was, in es-
sence, revoking PATCO's certification as an exclusive repre-
sentative months before the FLRA could do so pursuant to
law. As was stated by the Honorable Harold Greene, United
States District Judge, in commenting on the government's re-
fusal to bargain: "If the President or the Secretary of Trans-
portation are saying that the union no longer exists as far as
we are concerned, we won't negotiate with them, we have no
further bargaining relationship with them, isn't that the same
as decertification?" 9
E. The President Arbitrarily Enforced The Law
The President allowed striking controllers to return to work
if they did so prior to midday on August 5, 1981. In so doing,
the President violated the proscription against allowing strik-
ing federal employees to be employed by the government.90
He also implicitly allowed controllers to remain on strike for
an additional two days.
According to Secretary Lewis, the controllers' strike ended
on August 5, 1981.91 Therefore, no controllers were on strike
longer than three days. It is not any worse to be on strike for
three days instead of two and the difference is certainly not
'e See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
87 Regional Director's Letter, supra note 10, at 2.
88 See Veterans Administration Hospital, 4 Fed. Lab. Rel. Auth. No. 59 (1980).
Statement by J. Harold Greene during oral argument in United States v.
PATCO, No. 81-1806 (D.D.C., filed Aug. 3, 1981); PATCO Appeal to FLRA General
Counsel of Refusal to Issue Complaint at 7-9, Fed. Lab. Rel. Auth. No. 3-CA-2729.
90 5 U.S.C. § 7311 (1976 & Supp. III 1979); 18 U.S.C. § 1918 (1976). See supra
notes 52-66 and accompanying text.
" See supra note 24.
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enough to justify firing some employees while allowing others
to return to work.
The President arbitrarily decided that some strikers had
broken the law and others had not. He was enforcing the law
pursuant to his own notions of political expediency, not ac-
cording to the letter of the law. Federal employees cannot be
expected to know when striking will be allowed and when it
will be punished, if the laws are enforced according to whim
and caprice. President Reagan was engaging in the type of ar-
bitrary reinstatement of striking employees based upon anti-
union animus which has been prohibited in the private sector
by the Supreme Court.92
F. The Government Has Tried to Destroy PATCO
The government filed legal actions against PATCO, its of-
ficers and members in sixty-six different federal judicial dis-
tricts." Requests for contempt fines followed requests for in-
junctive relief.
An adequate scheme for protecting the government from
strikes is established by the Civil Service Reform Act of
1978.9" Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 7123(d), the FLRA can obtain a
temporary restraining order in a district court, enjoining the
commission of unfair labor practices (such as strikes), while
its own administrative procedures are pending. The FLRA re-
ceived just such an injunction during the PATCO strike.9
There is no valid reason why the government could not
have relied upon section 7123(d) to enjoin the controllers'
strike instead of proceeding in sixty-six different courts at
once. The needless legal onslaught had two purposes - tying
the hands of PATCO's counsel, and forcing PATCO to spend
huge amounts of its resources defending against sixty-six sep-
arate legal actions.
The government attempted to stretch due process to the
" See, e.g., NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278 (1965).
" See supra note 21.
" Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111 (1978). See,
e.g., 5 U.S.C. §§ 7116(b)(7)(A), 7118(a)(7), 7123(a), 7123(d) (Supp. 1II 1979).
95 Graham v. PATCO, 524 F. Supp. 160 (D.D.C. 1981).
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breaking point by amassing the vast resources of the Justice
Department, the Executive Branch, and the White House
against a relatively small labor union.
V. CONCLUSION
The idea that government employees are different from
other types of workers is without foundation ... the gov-
ernment as an employer, should be no more sovereign
than other employers."
Letter from Representative John Conyers to
the New York Times, 8/13/81
We recognize ... [the right to strike] ... in spite of the
inconvenience, and in some cases perhaps danger, to the
people of the United States, which may result from the
exercise of such right."
Senator Robert Taft
More than anything else, the PATCO strike has pointed out
"the inherent, irresolvable conflict between giving public
workers the right to bargain, on the one hand, and declaring
strikes by such workers illegal, on the other."' Airline pilots
and flight attendants can strike. So can electricians and ma-
chinists working for airlines. Utility company employees, rail-
road workers, and others whose services are no less essential
than those of air traffic controllers, can strike. As the Honora-
ble United States Circuit Judge Harry T. Edwards has stated:
"[ilt outrages modern notions of industrial democracy to rele-
gate a large segment of the work force to dependence upon
the conscience of the government.""
Most Americans think of the Executive Branch only in rela-
N. Y. Times, Aug. 13, 1981, at 22, col. 3.
93 CONG. REC. 3835 (1947).
N. Y. Times, Aug. 8, 1981, at 6, col. 6.
Edwards, The Developing Labor Relations Law in the Public Sector, 10 DuQ. L.
REv. 357, 361 (1972).
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tion to its role as a regulator. It is also an employer of millions
of Americans. Just as the government should have no more
rights as an employer than a private employer, so federal em-
ployees should have the same rights and privileges as their
private sector counterparts. Until such equality is reached, the
events of August 1981 are bound to be repeated.
Comments, Casenotes
and
Statute Notes

